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THE CARTOON CONTROVERSY IN 
CONTEXT: ANALYZING THE DECISION 
NOT TO PROSECUTE UNDER DANISH LAW 
Stéphanie Lagoutte* 
INTRODUCTION 
n September 2005, the publication of twelve cartoons in the daily 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten started a small storm in the Danish me-
dia.1 A few months later, demonstrators around the world organized to 
protest the cartoons. In Syria, Lebanon, and Iran, demonstrators acted out 
against Danish embassies, making threats and setting fires.2 The storm 
became a hurricane, and Denmark found itself in the middle of its big-
gest diplomatic crisis in recent memory. After a few weeks, the storm 
abated. A mere nine months had passed since the cartoons’ initial publi-
cation when United Nations (“U.N.”) Secretary General Kofi Annan vis-
ited Denmark on June 18, 2006. In comments to journalists, he observed 
that the page had turned in the cartoon controversy and consequently 
journalists should forego examination of the past in favor of looking 
ahead.3 Notwithstanding the need to avoid inflaming such controversies, 
a concern that no doubt motivated Annan’s comments, it is equally, if not 
more important, to scrutinize such stories to understand their mecha-
nisms and trajectories prior to looking ahead and moving on. 
Before unraveling the events of September 2005, it is necessary to 
mention an important historical antecedent: Danish prosecution of Nazis 
for blasphemy. In 1938, the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre 
Landsret) confirmed the conviction of a number of Danish Nazis for 
blasphemy under section 140 of the Danish Criminal Code for having, 
among other things, distributed media that falsely stated that the Talmud 
permitted Jewish men to force non-Jewish girls to engage in sexual inter-
                                                                                                             
 *  Stéphanie Lagoutte, Researcher at the Danish Institute for Human Rights. Doctor 
in Law (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France), Ph.D. (Århus University, 
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 1. See Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDS-
POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, reprinted in PROFET-AFFÆREN [THE PROPHET AFFAIR] 14–
15 (Anders Jerikow & Mille Rode eds., Dansk PEN 2006) (reprinting the cartoons) [here-
inafter THE PROPHET AFFAIR]. 
 2. THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 145–53. 
 3. DR1 21 O’clock News (DR1 television broadcast, June 18, 2006). DR1 is a TV 
channel of the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, a public broadcasting company. 
I 
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course.4 This case was the last time a court handed down a criminal con-
viction for blasphemy in Denmark. It reflects a Denmark that protected 
its minority population from abuses; this is all the more noteworthy be-
cause it took place at a time when anti-Semitism was widespread in 
Europe.5 
In contrast, returning to the cartoon controversy of 2005, Danish au-
thorities were of the opinion that there was no legal basis for a response 
to the Jylland-Posten’s controversial publication.6 From the perspective 
of international human rights law, even though freedom of expression is 
a human right protected by a number of international conventions, gov-
ernmental restrictions on freedom of expression are permitted by interna-
tional human rights law.7 However, tolerating interference with freedom 
of expression is not the same as requiring such interference in order to 
protect the freedom and rights of others. In other words, although Danish 
authorities elected not to intervene in the cartoon controversy, they could 
have, had there been a legal basis for doing so, without violating the in-
ternational law provisions protecting freedom of expression. By the same 
                                                                                                             
 4. UfR 1938.419 Ø(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Eastern Denmark); see 
Henning Koch, Ytringsfrihed og Tro [Freedom of Expression and Belief], in 
GUDEBILLEDER: YTRINGSFRIHED OG RELIGION I EN GLOBALISERET VERDEN. ANTOLOGI. 
[IMAGES OF GODS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RELIGION IN A GLOBAL WORLD. 
ANTHOLOGY.] 72, 76 (Lisbet Christoffersen ed., Tiderne Skifter 2006) (discussing 
prevalence of anti-Semitism in Europe during World War II). 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON GLOBAL ANTI-SEMITISM (Jan. 5, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/40258.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). 
 6. See Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til 11 ambassadører [Letter from 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the 11 Ambassadors] (Oct. 21, 2005), re-
printed in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 28; Undenrigsminister Per Stig Møller: 
Brev til Egyptens udenrigsminister [Letter from Foreign Affairs Minister Per Stig Møller 
to the Egyptian Foreign Minister] (Nov. 8, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, 
supra note 1, at 34. Both letters reflect the Danish authorities’ refusal to use political 
means to respond to the controversy. See also DPP Decision, infra note 9 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute). 
 7. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(3), opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]. Article 19(3) states:  
The exercise of [the right to freedom of expression] carries with it special du-
ties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but 
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For re-
spect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national se-
curity or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. 
Id. 
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token, in refraining from such interference, the Danish authorities did not 
violate any positive obligations under human rights provisions.8 
More time must pass before it will be possible to document and under-
stand exactly all the interests at stake and the various processes involved 
in the cartoon controversy. The purpose of this Article is therefore sim-
ply to acquaint the reader with the Danish context, to explain the legal 
implications of the crisis in Denmark, and to root out some of the popular 
misunderstandings about both. It is not a goal of this Article to address 
the international dimensions of the crisis. Among other important ele-
ments, it will instead show how the crisis originated in a misunderstand-
ing of competing values such that a choice was made to advance one 
value (freedom of expression) to the exclusion of certain others (non-
discrimination, respect for other religions, protection of minorities, etc.), 
despite the fact that the Danish authorities, among them the Prime Minis-
ter, had a variety of solutions at their disposal for tackling the situation. 
Even though the ultimate decision not to take action was not a direct vio-
lation of international human rights obligations, a choice more consistent 
with Denmark’s historical commitment to the support and protection of 
minorities probably could have been made.9 
This Article explores the many components of the Danish cartoon con-
troversy in an attempt to understand what really happened and has been 
happening in Denmark since late 2005. Part I sets forth a brief factual 
account of the genesis of the cartoon controversy. Part II then goes on to 
discuss the legal framework for the controversy—both in Denmark and 
internationally. Next, Part III looks at the Danish Director of Public 
Prosecution’s decision not to bring criminal proceedings in response to 
the cartoons’ publication. Finally, Part IV examines the emphasis placed 
on freedom of expression in both the Danish and international arenas. 
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS IN DENMARK 
The twelve drawings at issue were published by Jyllands-Posten, a ma-
jor Danish newspaper, in an article called The Face of Mohammed on 
September 30, 2005.10 In an excerpt from the article that appeared on the 
                                                                                                             
 8. See generally John Cerone, Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reduction-
ist Resolutions, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 357 (2008) (discussing how international human 
rights law can accommodate both freedom of expression and freedom of religion). 
 9. See Director of Public Prosecutions [DPP], Decision on Possible Criminal Pro-
ceedings in the Case of Jyllands-Posten’s Article “The Face of Muhammed,” No. RA-
2006-41-0151, Mar. 15, 2006, available at http://www.rigsadvokaten.dk/media/ 
bilag/afgorelse_engelsk.pdf [hereinafter DPP Decision]. 
 10. See Anders Jerichow & Mille Rode, Forord [Foreward] to THE PROPHET AFFAIR, 
supra note 1, at 9. 
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front page, the newspaper reproduced one of the cartoons and explained 
that the newspaper had invited members of the Danish Newspaper Illus-
trators’ Union to submit drawings of Mohammed “as they saw him.”11 
This excerpt read in part: “Some Muslims reject modern, secular society. 
They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of 
their own religious feelings. This is incompatible with secular democracy 
and freedom of expression, where one has to be ready to put up with 
scorn, mockery and ridicule.”12 
The Face of Mohammed was set out in three columns surrounded by 
the twelve drawings.13 The article, written by Flemming Rose, the news-
paper’s cultural editor, was headed Freedom of Expression and drew at-
tention to recent incidents in which authors engaged in self-censorship 
(three were mentioned) to avoid provoking Muslims.14 In addition, the 
article noted that during a meeting with the Prime Minister “an imam 
urged the government to use its influence over the Danish media so that 
they can draw a more positive picture of Islam.”15 The article opined that 
such incidents reflected a desire of some Muslims for special treatment, 
which presented a threat to the free exchange of ideas in the public fo-
rum.16 Although the article did not itself explain its choice to juxtapose 
                                                                                                             
 11. Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDS-
POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 14–16. 
 12. Id. at 14. 
 13. For reproductions of the page from the Jyllands-Posten, see id. at 15. For a de-
scription in English of the twelve drawings, see DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 2–3. See 
also Joel Brinkley & Ian Fisher, U.S. Says It Also Finds Cartoons of Muhammad Offen-
sive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at A3. 
 14. Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDS-
POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 14–16. 
 15. “[E]n imam regeringen til at gøre sin indflydelse gældende over for danske 
medier, så de kan tegne et mere positivt billede af islam.” See DPP Decision, supra note 
9, at 2 (quoting and translating Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mo-
hammed], JYLLANDS-POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, at KulturWeekend 3). 
 16. Id. (citing Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], 
JYLLANDS-POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, at KulturWeekend 3). According to the DPP 
Decision, the Flemming article stated: 
De anførte eksempler giver grund til bekymring, hvad enten den oplevede frygt 
hviler på et falsk grundlag eller ej. Faktum er, at den findes, og at den fører til 
selvcensur. Der sker en intimidering af det offentlige rum. Kunstnere, forfat-
tere, tegnere, oversættere og teaterfolk går derfor i en stor bue uden om vor tids 
vigtige kulturmøde, det mellem islam og de sekulære, vestlige samfund med 
rod i kristendommen. 
Id. The translation reads as follows: 
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the article with the Mohammed drawings, Denmark’s Director of Public 
Prosecutions (“DPP”) ultimately stated that the basic assumption “must 
be that Jyllands-Posten commissioned the drawings for the purpose of 
debating, in a provocative manner, whether, in a secular society, special 
regard should be paid to the religious feelings of some Muslims.”17 
Reactions in Denmark were immediate. A few days after publication, 
the illustrators at Jyllands-Posten received death threats.18 On October 5, 
2005, a spokesman for various Danish Muslim associations19 appealed to 
the diplomatic missions of Muslim states to take part in an official pro-
test.20 Some of these associations issued a joint press release expressing 
                                                                                                             
The cited examples give cause for concern, regardless of whether the fear ex-
perienced is founded on a false basis. The fact is that the fear does exist and 
that it leads to self-censorship. The public space is being intimidated. Artists, 
authors, illustrators, translators and people in theatre are therefore steering a 
wide berth around the most important meeting of cultures in our time—the 
meeting between Islam and the secular society of the West, which is rooted in 
Christianity. 
Id. 
 17. DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 6. However, the Jyllands-Posten article itself has a 
much broader perspective: 
Some Muslims reject modern, secular society. They demand a special position, 
insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is incom-
patible with secular democracy and freedom of expression, where one has to be 
ready to put up with scorn, mockery and ridicule. It is therefore no coincidence 
that people living in totalitarian societies are sent off to jail for telling jokes or 
for critical depictions of dictators. As a rule, this is done with reference to the 
fact that it offends people’s feelings. In Denmark, we have not yet reached this 
stage, but the cited examples show that we are on a slippery slope to a place 
where no one can predict what self-censorship will lead to. 
Id. at 2. 
 18. However, it was soon discovered that the threats had been sent by a seventeen-
year-old boy who was mentally ill and could not be attributed to Muslim organizations. 
See 17-årig Sigtet for Trusler [17-year-old Target of Threats], JYLLANDS-POSTEN 
[JUTLAND POST] (Den.), Oct. 15, 2005, available at http://jp.dk/indland/article211610.ece. 
 19. The organizations in question were: the Islamic Faith Community (Islamisk Tros-
samfund), the Islamic Federation (Islamisk Forbund), and the Group of Muslim Immi-
grants Associations (Sammenslutningen af Muslimske Indvandrerforeninger). The Is-
lamic Faith Community, the most prominent of the three organizations, has been called 
“conservative.” ULLA HOLM, THE DANISH UGLY DUCKLING AND THE MOHAMMED 
CARTOONS 1 (Danish Inst. for Int’l Studies 2006), http://www.diis.dk/graphics/ 
Publications/Briefs2006/uho_muhammed1.pdf. 
 20. Islamisk trossamfund m.fl.: Brev til muslimske ambassadører [Letter from the 
Muslim Organizations to the Muslim Ambassadors in Denmark] (Oct. 5, 2005), reprinted 
in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
384 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
their concerns and criticisms.21 The appeal to foreign diplomatic mis-
sions by the Danish-Muslim community is quite disturbing in itself; de-
spite the variety of reasons that may have motivated the appeal, it leaves 
the strong impression that, at the time, some representatives of the Dan-
ish-Muslim community did not think the Danish government would pro-
tect their interests as a religious minority. Moreover, the involvement of 
foreign authorities in the crisis gave it all the dimensions of a diplomatic 
crisis at a very early stage. 
A week after this appeal, ambassadors from Muslim countries re-
sponded with a letter to the Danish Prime Minister denouncing an “on-
going smear campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam 
and Muslims” and requesting an urgent meeting.22 In addition to the car-
toons, the ambassadors cited various episodes: a racist program on a Nazi 
radio station, derogatory remarks against Muslims by a member of Par-
liament, and a statement by the Minister of Culture about the “war” 
against Muslims.23 The Prime Minister responded in a letter that empha-
sized freedom of expression, religious tolerance, and the equality of all 
religions in Denmark. 24 He explained that Danish law prohibited blas-
phemous and racist expressions and that potential victims could bring a 
case before the Danish courts.25 Although he dwelled on the importance 
of dialogue between cultures and religions in Denmark and the need for 
international cooperation between Denmark and the Muslim world, he 
made no mention of a meeting.26 
In the following weeks and months, a debate about these events raged 
in Denmark. The public debate took place on several levels: a legal dis-
cussion on the freedom of the press, freedom of religion, protection of 
minorities, blasphemy and hate speech; a media-ethics discussion on the 
role played by Jyllands-Posten; and a more general political discussion 
on the place of the Muslim community and religion in general in Den-
mark.27 Various actors took part: politicians from both majority and op-
                                                                                                             
 21. Islamisk Trossamfund i pressemeddelelse [Islamic Faith Community Press Re-
lease] (Oct. 11, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
 22. Muslimske ambassadører: Brev til Danmarks statsminister [Letter from the Mus-
lim Ambassadors to the Danish Prime Minister] (Oct. 12, 2005), reprinted in THE 
PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 24. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til 11 ambassadører [Letter from the 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the 11 Ambassadors] (Oct. 21, 2005), re-
printed in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 28. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Islamisk Trossamfund, Pressemeddelelse [Islamic Faith Community 
Press Release], Vi Ønsker Værn Om Vores Borgerlige Rettigheder [We Wish to Protect 
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position parties; scholars, journalists, and news commentators; Christian 
Danes, resident Muslims, and Danish-Muslim citizens.28 One of the prin-
cipal characteristics of the debate was its polarization: freedom of ex-
pression versus protection of minorities and Danish traditionalists versus 
Muslim immigrants.29 The internationalization of the crisis only aggra-
vated the polemics. It would take more time for a nuanced attitude to 
enter the public debate. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN DENMARK 
A. The International Legal Framework 
Knowing now what happened in and around September 2005, it is im-
portant to examine the legal structures at play. As far as the international 
legal framework is concerned, Denmark has ratified all major human 
rights instruments, with only two exceptions: the Revised European So-
cial Charter of 1996 and Protocol 12 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.30 The treaties that Denmark has signed, notably the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
contain substantive obligations to protect freedom of expression while 
                                                                                                             
Our Civil Rights], reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 35–39 (listing a 
number of concerns expressed by some Muslims in Denmark); Marianne Jelved, Om 
Ytringsfrihed Endnu Engang [About Freedom of Expression One More Time], DET 
RADIKALE VENSTRE [RADICAL PARTY WEEKLY LETTER] (Jan. 13, 2006), reprinted in THE 
PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 70–71 (describing Danish priests preaching tolerance 
in various churches for the New Year 2006). 
 28. See Enhedslisten [Red-Green Alliance], Ytringsfriheden gælder for alle [Freedom 
of Expression is for Everyone] (Dec. 3, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra 
note 1, at 41–43 (comments from various politicians and political parties); Rikke Hvil-
shøj, integrationsminister [Minister for Integration], Stop klyngeriet [Stop Whimpering], 
POLITIKEN (Dec. 20, 2005), in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 58–59; Statsminister 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen [Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen], Nytarståle [New 
Year’s Speech] (Jan. 1, 2006), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 63–64; 
Pia Kjærsgaard, Frø af ugræs . . . Fjenden indefra har presset Danmark ud i en ustyrlig 
situation [Seeds of Weeds . . . The Enemy Within our Borders Has Pressed Denmark into 
an Uncontrollable Situation] (Jan. 6, 2006), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra 
note 1, at 65–68. 
 29. See 22 tidligere ambassadører Udtalelse [Press Release, 22 Former Danish Am-
bassadors Denouncing the Toughening of the Debate], POLITIKEN (Dec. 19, 2005), re-
printed in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 57. See also supra notes 27–28. 
 30. Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised) May 5, 1996, Europ. T.S. 
No. 163; Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177. 
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permitting states to limit that freedom in certain circumstances.31 Al-
though Danish authorities at the time maintained that these obligations 
did not permit remedial action on their part, in fact had they chosen to, 
they would not have violated any obligation.32 The two instruments that 
Denmark did not ratify are not directly implicated by the cartoon contro-
versy but Denmark’s decision not to ratify them is symptomatic of recent 
changes in Danish society that were a contributing factor in escalating 
the tensions surrounding the Jyllands-Posten cartoons. More specifically, 
these changes reflect a general skepticism of the Danish authorities re-
garding international human rights instruments. For example, concerning 
Protocol 12:  
the Danish government is very concerned at the increasing transferal of 
legislative powers from the national parliaments to international non-
legislative bodies which cannot be seen as democratically elected or-
gans. Upon ratification, the European Court of Human Rights would be 
granted final jurisdiction in matters concerning whether Danish legisla-
tion is in compliance with Protocol No.12.33  
This statement is especially surprising coming as it does from a country 
that was one of the original state parties to the European Convention of 
Human Rights and that has historically been active in the Council of 
Europe.34 
                                                                                                             
 31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19 & 20, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 10 & 17, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. See Cerone, supra note 8, at 363–64 (dis-
cussing the interrelation between freedom of expression and other rights and obligations 
under the ICCPR and the ECHR). 
 32. See Cerone, supra note 8, at 360. 
 33. See DANISH INST. FOR HUM. RTS., PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE NORDIC 
COUNTRIES: THE COMPLICATED FATE OF PROTOCOL NO.12 TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (Stéphanie Lagoutte ed., 2005). 
 34. On November 4, 1950, Denmark was among the first states to sign the Council’s 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Council of 
Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Chart, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF 
=2/28/2008&CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). Denmark was also one of the found-
ing members of the Council of Europe, together with ten other Western European coun-
tries. Council of Europe, Statute of the Council of Europe Chart, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=001&CM=8&DF=2/28/2
008&CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). Since then, Denmark has signed and ratified 
all the protocols amending and completing the European Convention on Human Rights. 
See Charts of Ratifications of Protocols at Council of Europe, List of Treaties, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2008). Denmark has also signed and ratified major Council of 
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B. The Danish Legal Framework 
Two provisions of the Danish Criminal Code (“DCC”)35 are implicated 
by the cartoon crisis: the hate-speech provision and the blasphemy provi-
sion. Section 266b(1)—the so-called racism and hate-speech provision—
states that  
any person who, publicly or with the intention of wider dissemination, 
makes a statement or imparts other information by which a group of 
people are threatened, insulted or degraded on account of their race, 
colour, national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual inclination shall be 
liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two 
years.36  
Section 140—the so-called blasphemy provision—provides that “any 
person who, in public, mocks or scorns the religious doctrines or acts of 
worship of any lawfully existing religious community in this country 
shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four 
months.”37 The object of protection of the hate speech provision, DCC 
section 266b, is a group of people belonging to a majority or a minority 
who are scorned or degraded, for example, on account of their religion.38 
On the other hand, the blasphemy provision, DCC section 140, seeks to 
protect religious feelings connected with religions doctrines and acts of 
worship.39 
Danish civil law provides little in the way of redress for victims of 
blasphemy and hate speech. The blasphemy provision appears in the 
chapter of the Danish Criminal Code concerned with prevention of pub-
lic disorder, which reflects the fact that in Denmark an attack on reli-
gious beliefs is viewed as harming society at large (public order) and not 
merely individual interests.40 Consequently, there is no civil liability pro-
vision that corresponds to the criminal provision on blasphemy. Like-
wise, there is no civil analog to the hate speech provision in DCC section 
266b(1). 
                                                                                                             
Europe human rights instruments. See, e.g., European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. 
No. 126. 
 35. The Danish Criminal Code is called Straffeloven (“Strfl”). An English translation 
of the Danish Criminal Code can be found in MALENE FRESE JENSEN ET AL., THE 
PRINCIPAL DANISH CRIMINAL ACTS 9–74 (3rd ed. 2006). 
 36. Strfl. § 266b(1), translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64. 
 37. Strfl. § 140, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 45. 
 38. See Strfl. § 266b, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64. 
 39. See Strfl. § 140, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 45. 
 40. Koch, supra note 4, at 74. 
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There is, however, a civil liability analog to the criminal defamation 
statute that could provide a private cause of action for both defamation 
and insult.41 According to section 26 of the Liability for Damages Act,42 
“[a] person who is responsible for the unlawful violation of another 
party’s freedom, peace, honour or person shall pay the aggrieved party 
compensation for injury to feelings or reputation.”43 Thus, a racist ex-
pression that also constitutes defamation could give rise to civil liability 
if it fulfilled the requirements of section 26 of the Liability for Damages 
Act. In particular, section 26 requires the aggrieved party to have suf-
fered adverse effects, which would probably have been difficult to prove 
in the case of the cartoon crisis.44 
Because of the limited availability of civil remedies under Danish law 
for blasphemy and hate speech, the prosecution becomes especially im-
portant as it is the only actor that can bring such a case before the Danish 
courts.45 Consequently, if the prosecution refuses to press the case, it is 
unlikely to be examined by any Danish court.46 
III. THE DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE 
On March 15, 2006, a decision of the Danish Director of Public Prose-
cution (“DPP”) announced its conclusion that there was no basis for 
criminal proceedings in response to the cartoon publication under either 
                                                                                                             
 41. Strfl. § 267, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64–65 (“Any person 
who violates the personal honor of another by offensive words . . . or by making or 
spreading allegations of an act likely to disparage him in the esteem of his fellow citizens 
shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment . . . .”). 
 42. Erstatningsansvarsloven [Liability for Damages Act], Consolidation Act No. 599 
(Sept. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Liability for Damages Act]. 
 43. Liability for Damages Act § 26 (“A person who is responsible for the unlawful 
violation of another party’s freedom, peace, honour or person shall pay the aggrieved 
party compensation for injury to feelings or reputation.”). 
 44. Building on the reasoning of the DPP under DCC section 266b, it can be argued 
that the cartoons were either too specific (they picture the Prophet) or too general (they 
picture no Muslims in particular). This view was later confirmed by the City Court of 
Århus. This court examined a private application from a number of Muslim associations 
based on the above-mentioned provisions, and the court ruled that the publication of the 
drawings and the article did not reveal an intention to insult the applicants. These two 
provisions required a direct link between the action and the victim; in this respect the 
court did not believe that the Muslim associations themselves had been insulted. The 
court also stated that the Muslim association could not show that it had a mandate to rep-
resent its members. See Århus City Court, Case No. BS 5-851/2006, in MENNESKERET I 
DANMARK. STATUS 2006, at 111 (Danish Institute for Human Rights 2006) (Danish ab-
stract of the unpublished decision) [hereinafter MENNESKERET]. 
 45. See infra Part III.D. 
 46. See infra Part III.D. 
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the blasphemy or hate-speech provisions in Danish law.47 This decision 
resolved an appeal from the decision of the Regional Public Prosecutor 
of Viborg declining, after an investigation, to prosecute a claim filed by a 
private person with the Chief of Police in Århus. The decision of the 
DPP not to prosecute was final.48 The following discussion summarizes 
the DPP’s decision, explains why the DPP’s decision foreclosed judicial 
consideration of the issues, and reflects on some of the DPP decision’s 
main points. 
A. The Decision Not to Prosecute Under the Blasphemy Provision 
In analyzing the field of DCC section 140’s application, the DPP ex-
plained that the statute protects “religious doctrines or acts of worship,” 
which covers both the internal and external religious life of a religious 
community, i.e., the doctrines (a creed, if any, and the central texts of the 
religion), institutions, practices, persons, and things (ritual acts, etc.) 
through which the religious community expresses acts of worship. Rely-
ing on the legislative record of the statute, the DPP concluded, however, 
that the statute did not protect religious feelings that are unrelated to the 
religious community’s acts of worship, thus excluding doctrines of an 
ethical or social nature. With respect to the element of “mockery or 
scorn” required by the statute, the DPP concluded that it encompassed 
expressions that convey either a lack of respect or contempt for the 
scorned object. In other words, “mockery or scorn” covered expressions 
of ridicule or contempt with a certain quantum of abuse. However, the 
DPP again invoked the statute’s legislative record to conclude that “pun-
ishment can be incurred only in ‘serious cases.’”49 
In applying the law thus explained to the facts, the DPP first concluded 
that because there is no general and absolute prohibition against drawing 
the Prophet Mohamed in Islam (although certain groups within the relig-
ion comply fully with the ban on his depiction), drawing the Prophet 
could not itself constitute a violation of section 140 of the Criminal 
Code.50 The DPP noted, however, that because some drawings were 
more than a mere depiction of the Prophet—they were caricatures—
those drawings required an assessment of whether the caricature of such 
a central figure in Islam implied ridicule of or contempt for Islamic reli-
gious doctrines and acts of worship; this required an analysis of the 
                                                                                                             
 47. DPP decision, supra note 9, at 9. 
 48. See infra Part III.D. 
 49. DPP decision, supra note 9, at 5. 
 50. Id. at 5–6. 
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drawings vis-à-vis the accompanying text.51 The DPP concluded that 
“the basic assumption must be that Jyllands-Posten commissioned the 
drawings for the purpose of in a provocative manner to debate whether, 
in a secular society, special regard should be paid to the religious feel-
ings of some Muslims.”52 Consequently, according to the DPP, the cari-
cature53 was “not an expression of mockery or ridicule, and hardly repre-
sents scorn within the meaning of [section] 140 of the Danish Criminal 
Code.”54 The DPP essentially reasoned that scorn within the meaning of 
section 140 is more serious, since it covers contempt and debasement. 
Thus, even if the intention of the newspaper was to mock, ridicule, and 
scorn, the means of expression did not reach a level serious enough to 
warrant prosecution under DCC section 140.55 
B. The Decision Not to Prosecute Under the Hate Speech Provision 
The DPP’s analysis of the hate speech provision, DCC section 266b, 
found that the dispositive inquiry was whether the article and the draw-
ings “insult” or “degrade” a “group of people,” here Muslims, on account 
of their religion.56 
Confronting this question with respect to the text of the article first, the 
DPP noted that the article did not refer to Muslims in general, but re-
ferred only to “some” Muslims, i.e., “Muslims who reject the modern, 
secular society and demand a special position in relation to their own 
religious feelings.”57 Although the DPP concluded that this subset was 
within the meaning of “a group of people” as used in section 266b, he 
nonetheless concluded that the article could not be considered scornful or 
degrading towards this group, even when viewed in context with the 
drawings.58 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id. 
 53. The only caricature that troubled the Director of Public Prosecution was one that: 
show[ed] the face of a grim-looking man with a turban shaped like an ignited 
bomb. . . . [because it was a] depiction of the Prophet Muhammad as a violent 
person. This drawing must be considered an incorrect depiction if it is with a 
bomb as a weapon, which in the context of today may be understood to imply 
terrorism. This depiction may with good reason be understood as an affront and 
insult to the Prophet who is an ideal for believing Muslims.  
Id. at 7. 
 54. DPP decision, supra note 9, at 7. 
 55. Id. at 7–8. 
 56. Id. at 8. 
 57. Id. at 9. 
 58. Id. 
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Next, the DPP considered whether the drawings themselves were in-
sulting or degrading to Muslims. The DPP concluded that the drawings 
depicted the Prophet Mohamed as a religious figure, but that none of 
them intended to refer to Muslims in general because the drawings de-
picting individuals other than the Prophet did not contain any general 
references to Muslims.59 For example, the DPP concluded that there was 
no basis for assuming that the drawing that represented the Prophet with 
a turban shaped like a bomb was intended to depict Muslims in general 
as perpetrators of violence or even as terrorists.60 The DPP went on to 
state more generally that even if the drawings’ depictions of Muslims 
were considered in context together with the text of the article, there was 
no basis to infer that they were scornful or degrading to Muslims at 
large.61 Accordingly, the DPP found that there had not “been any viola-
tion of Section 266b of the Danish Criminal Code.”62 
C. The Clarification of the Director for Public Prosecution 
After analyzing these legal issues at length and determining that there 
was no basis for instituting criminal proceedings in this case, the DPP 
concluded with an unusual general statement. He noted that the provi-
sions of the Danish Criminal Code on blasphemy and hate-speech, as 
well as the provision concerning defamation of character, contain restric-
tions on the freedom of expression.63 Consequently, to the extent that 
public expressions fall within the scope of these rules, there is no unre-
stricted right to express opinions about religious subjects.64 This com-
ment in effect means that under existing law, it was misleading for the 
Jyllands-Posten article to state that the right to freedom of expression is 
incompatible with special consideration for religious feelings and that 
people must tolerate “scorn, mockery and ridicule.”65 In light of the gen-
eral debate, the DPP was making a broader point: freedom of expression 
is not absolute in Denmark. Expression that is sufficiently scornful or 
contemptuous will fall within the scope of one or the other of the two 
provisions.66 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. 
 60. DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 9. See also supra note 53 (describing the cartoon). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 10. 
 65. DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 10. 
 66. See id. 
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D. The Central Role Played by the Prosecution 
The blasphemy and hate-speech provisions invoked in the DPP deci-
sion belong to a list of offences that are considered important both with 
respect to social order at large and in relation to civil liberties protected 
by the Danish Constitution.67  Thus, according to the Administration of 
Justice Act, violations of sections 140 and 266b are subject to public 
prosecution only.68 Consequently, the decision not to prosecute put an 
end to the legal controversy generated by the cartoons under Danish do-
mestic law. 
The Administration of Justice Act essentially ensures that the DPP’s 
decision not to prosecute is, for all intents and purposes, final. Under the 
Act, the regional public prosecutor in the first instance and the Director 
of Public Prosecution on appeal play a central role in the procedure.69 
Although the DPP hears appeals from decisions made by regional public 
prosecutors in first instance,70 a decision by the DPP cannot be appealed 
to the Minister of Justice.71 However, the Act does not give the Minister 
of Justice authority in the first instance to issue orders to public prosecu-
tors concerning the treatment of specific cases, including whether to 
commence, continue, refrain from, or terminate prosecution.72 
In addition, even though there is no appeal to the Minister of Justice 
from the DPP’s decision, section 63 of the Danish Constitution provides 
                                                                                                             
 67. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 
Questionnaire on Domestic Law Concerning the Prohibition of Blasphemy, Religious 
Insults and Incitement to Religious Hatred, at 34–35, Study No. 406/2006, CDL-
FR(2007)002 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-
FR(2007)002-e.pdf [hereinafter European Commission for Democracy Through Law]. 
 68. Administration of Justice Act § 719(2)(3), reproduced in Bekendtgørelse af lov 
om rettens pleje [Notice of the Law on the Administration of Justice] (BK nr 1261 af Oct. 
23, 2007), available at https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=105378 
[hereinafter Notice of the Law on the Administration of Justice]. 
 69. This is an exception to the normal rule, which is that the Chief of Police decides 
whether to initiate criminal proceedings. See European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law, supra note 67 at 34. 
 70. Administration of Justice Act § 99(3), reproduced in Notice of the Law on the 
Administration of Justice, supra note 68. 
 71. Id. More generally, there is a principle in Danish administrative law according to 
which there is only one opportunity for administrative appeal. 
 72. Administration of Justice Act § 98(2), reproduced in Notice of the Law on the 
Administration of Justice, supra note 68. The instruction must be in writing and state the 
reasons for the decision. Furthermore, the Speaker of the Parliament must be informed 
(this safeguard was introduced in 2005). The potential for political interference in prose-
cutions and concrete cases has rightly been criticized by legal scholars, though actual use 
of the provision is very limited. European Commission for Democracy Through Law, 
supra note 67, at 35. 
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for judicial review of the decisions of administrative authorities, includ-
ing those of the Director of Public Prosecutions.73 The Ombudsman of 
the Parliament is also competent to review such decisions.74 However, 
their authority to review the discretionary authority of the DPP to prose-
cute under these provisions is limited. The Danish courts and the Om-
budsman are only permitted to review the DPP’s decision for an abuse of 
discretion, i.e., whether the criteria applied were legal or whether all 
relevant criteria were included,75 but they may not evaluate how the DPP 
balances these criteria in the exercise of his discretion.76 
As a result of these features of the Danish legal system, namely the 
lack of civil remedies77 and the broad, nearly unreviewable discretion of 
the DPP, once the DPP made a legally sustainable decision not to prose-
cute (in the sense that the decision strictly but correctly follows Danish 
precedent interpreting DCC sections 140 and 266b), no remedies—
whether administrative or judicial—were then available. Consequently, 
the decision of the DPP concluded litigation in Denmark, foreclosed any 
judicial consideration of the issue, and brought the legal discussion into 
the international arena.78 
E. Brief Comments on the Decision 
Although the DPP’s decision was well received in Danish legal fora, it 
deserves comment because the DPP chose to construe the Danish legal 
framework in an exceptionally narrow way. 
Generally speaking, a basic tenet of interpretation in criminal law is 
that it should be interpreted narrowly. Following the principle nulla 
                                                                                                             
 73. Den. Const. art. 63(1) (providing that the courts of justice shall be empowered to 
decide any question relating to the scope of the executive’s authority). 
 74. The Ombudsman Act, Act No. 473 (June 12, 1996), reprinted in THE DANISH 
OMBUDSMAN 2005, at 50 (Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen & Jens Olsen eds., 2005). 
 75. Kaj Larsen, The Parliamentary Ombudsman, in THE DANISH OMBUDSMAN 2005, 
supra note 74, at 57, 98. 
 76. Id. at 103. 
 77. Liability for Damages Act § 26. See also supra note 43. The Liability for Damage 
Act § 26 is the civil pendant of DCC section 267. See Århus City Court Case Abstract, in 
MENNESKERET, supra note 44, at 111. 
 78. A case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights, but the court 
declined to hear the case on jurisdictional grounds. Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, App. No. 
5853/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “case-law” then 
“HUDOC,” select “decisions” on the left hand column and search for the application 
number) (finding no jurisdictional link between the applicants, Moroccans living in Mo-
rocco, and the defending state, Denmark). 
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poena sine lege,79 judges should not broadly interpret criminal laws so as 
to risk creating new offenses, which would violate fundamental human 
rights norms.80 The DPP invoked this principle as reflected in the legisla-
tive record of the blasphemy statute:  
[a]ccording to the legislative material and precedents, Section 140 of 
the Danish Criminal Code is to be interpreted narrowly. Therefore the 
affront and insult to the Prophet Mohammed, which the drawing may 
be understood to be, accordingly cannot, with the necessary certainty, 
be assumed to be a punishable offence under Section 140 of the Danish 
Criminal Code.81 
Other Danish cases that are comparable to the cartoon case suggest that 
the modern practice has been to refrain from instigating prosecutions in 
such cases. As mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, the last con-
viction under the blasphemy law occurred in 1938.82 Since then, two 
cases have come before Danish courts—one in 1946 and the other in 
1971—and neither resulted in a conviction.83 Since the middle of the 
1970s, public prosecutors in Denmark have chosen not to press charges 
in similar cases. For example, the most recent blasphemy case, brought 
in 1985, concerned the owner of a restaurant in North Jutland who had 
painted a crucified Jesus with an erection on the façade of his restau-
rant.84 In that case, the DPP stated that it was customary to avoid prose-
cuting alleged blasphemy offenses and that he saw no reason to diverge 
from the general practice in that particular case.85 The case was appealed 
to the Justice Ministry, and the Ministry responded that the proper course 
of action would be to bring the case before a court in order to determine 
                                                                                                             
 79. The Latin translates as “no penalty without a law.” See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1098 (8th ed. 1999). 
 80. The principle of the non-retroactivity of criminal law is one of the few non-
derogable human rights. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
art. 4(2), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(2), 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 81. DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 7. 
 82. See UfR 1938.419 Ø(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Eastern 
Denmark); Koch, supra note 4. 
 83. See Gennemgang af Relevante Retsregler Mv [Review of Relevant Legal Regula-
tions], BILAG 1 J.NR. RA-2006-41-0151 § 3.5 (Mar. 15, 2006) (DPP documentation dis-
cussing an unpublished 1946 case in which defendants were fined but not brought to 
court and an unpublished 1971 case in which defendants were acquitted) [hereinafter 
Mar. 15, 2006 Documentation]. 
 84. See id. (discussing unpublished case file no. 133/85 in which the court concluded 
that the action was moot because the painting had been taken down). 
 85. See Mar. 15, 2006 Documentation, supra note 83, § 3.5. 
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the scope of the blasphemy provision. However, the Justice Ministry de-
cided not to reverse the DPP’s decision because the painting had already 
been taken down and a separate case had been brought against the owner 
of the restaurant alleging that the offending sign was in violation of city 
planning rules, rendering prosecution under the blasphemy provision un-
necessary.86 
Although there is no disputed legal issue with respect to the DPP’s in-
terpretation of the blasphemy statute in declining to prosecute in the car-
toon controversy case, there is an important, albeit subtle, distinction be-
tween the strict, technical legal decision of the DPP and the Justice Min-
istry’s decision not to prosecute in the case just described. In the latter 
case, the Justice Ministry was implicitly critical of the DPP’s decision, 
but declined to interfere with established practice. It is exactly this nu-
ance, that is political sensitivity to and indirect support for the sentiments 
of the offended part of the population, that is absent in the cartoon con-
troversy. 
Unlike the blasphemy statute, the hate-speech provision has been the 
subject of a rather more weighty legal discussion, especially with respect 
to the gravity criterion.87 The definition of the hate-speech offense pun-
ishable by DCC section 266b contains the requirement that the statement 
or dissemination of information should be threatening, mocking, or hu-
miliating.88 The statute does not require the prosecution to present evi-
dence that the subject of the alleged hate speech was actually aware of or 
felt threatened, mocked, or humiliated by the statement.89 Consequently, 
the statute requires an objective assessment of whether the statement in 
the specific context can reasonably be expected to produce fear or feel-
ings of mockery or humiliation. An element of intent must also be pre-
sent, which is closely linked to the offending statement being presented 
publicly and which requires that the perpetrator had the intention of 
mocking, humiliating, or threatening a group when making the state-
ment.90 When considered together with the fact that the test for whether 
the content is “threatening, mocking or humiliating” is an objective one, 
the assessment of intent will most often be linked to whether the perpe-
trator has realized that the statement could be perceived as “threatening, 
mocking or humiliating” according to normal usage. Finally, based on 
                                                                                                             
 86. See id. 
 87. See DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BRIEF ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
INSPIRED BY THE MOHAMMED DRAWINGS IN JYLLANDS-POSTEN 14 (2006), 
http://www.cihrs.org/Act_file/PDF/85_1812200653621.pdf. 
 88. Strfl § 266b, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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the legislative record for section 266b, it appears that the statement must 
also meet a minimum requirement of gravity.91 For example, general 
statements linking an ethnic group with serious types of crime usually 
meet this gravity requirement.92 Although in Denmark it is generally 
agreed that politicians who participate in public debates have wide free-
dom of expression when they make statements about controversial social 
issues, the practice of the Danish courts has shown that these politicians 
are not exempt from punishment.93 Because of the criterion of minimum 
gravity, it can be assumed that, contrary to the practice concerning blas-
phemy,94 a statement that meets the level of gravity required by section 
266b will amount to hate-speech, even in an artistic or satirical context. 
Strictly speaking, the DPP’s decision not to prosecute under the hate 
speech provision is more or less consistent with restrictive Danish judi-
cial interpretation. However, it is regrettable that the DPP’s restrictive 
interpretation excludes any reference to the broader socio-political con-
text within which the Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons were published; this 
approach would be in line with the practice of the International Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) and of the 
European Court of Human Rights.95 In this respect, it is problematic that 
the DPP overlooked the views expressed by the ICERD in its decision 
not to prosecute.96 
                                                                                                             
 91. See UfR 1988.788 V(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Western Denmark 
in 1988). 
 92. See UfR 2004.734 H (Den.) (judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in 2004 
concerning a Danish politician who had declared on his Web site that Muslims in Den-
mark perpetrated gross crimes and were a threat to ethnic Danes). See also UfR 
2003.2559 Ø(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Eastern Denmark in 2003 con-
cerning an anti-Semitic and Islamaphobic song posted to a Web site). 
 93. See UfR 2000.2234 H (Den.) (judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in 2000); 
UfR 2004.734 H (Den.) (judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in 2004). 
 94. See Mar. 15, 2006 Documentation, supra note 83, § 3.5 (discussing the unpub-
lished case file No. 133/85 concerning the Jesus painting). 
 95. See generally Cerone, supra note 8 (discussing the feasibility of reconciling free-
dom of speech with human rights principles under various human rights instruments). 
 96. The Danish Member of the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination and the director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights have suggested that 
the DPP decision lacked a comprehensive analysis of the international human rights in-
struments (such as the ICERD) that are directly applicable in Danish law. Section 266b 
was inserted in the DCC to bring Denmark into compliance with its obligations under the 
ICERD. See Paragraf 266 b: Hvor Blev 266 b Af? [Paragraph 266b: What Has It Gotten 
To?], POLITIKEN, Mar. 16, 2006, http://www.sf.dk/index.php?article=10803. 
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IV. WHY THE EMPHASIS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 
As the above analysis shows, the Danish decision to refrain from 
prosecution in the cartoon controversy is not especially problematic in its 
interpretation of Danish law. That said, it may come as a surprise to 
many that the legal proceedings were ended by an authority (the DPP) 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice without any judicial consid-
eration of the matter. Statements by the Prime Minister that offended 
parties could always bring their claims before the Danish courts were 
patently false;97 once the DPP declined to prosecute, the Danish courts 
were precluded from hearing the case. 
Returning to the debate surrounding the cartoons, the most striking 
element was the emphasis on the allegedly absolute quality of freedom of 
expression. Yet there are, as we have seen, provisions in the Danish 
Criminal Code that criminalize some forms of expression. In addition, 
the major international and regional human rights instruments call for 
limitations on freedom of expression as well as its protection.98 Article 
10(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (“European Convention of Human Rights”), which has 
been incorporated into Danish law, states that the exercise of freedom of 
expression “carries with it duties and responsibilities, [that] may be sub-
ject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society . . . .”99 
Within this well established legal context, the emphasis on the alleg-
edly absolute character of freedom of expression in the early stages of 
the cartoon controversy most likely reflects a political choice detached 
from the legal and human rights issues at stake in the case. Not surpris-
ingly, the consequences of this choice far exceeded its original context. 
The exact motivations for choosing—consciously or not—such a strategy 
will surely be analyzed in the future by political scientists and historians. 
My purpose here is merely to provide some initial observations that may 
help explain the events in Denmark in 2005 by placing them in a broader 
Danish context. 
                                                                                                             
 97. See Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til Den Islamiske Konference-
Organisation [Letter from the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference] (Oct. 31, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET 
AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 29; Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til 11 ambas-
sadører [Letter from Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the 11 Ambassadors]  
(Oct. 21, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 28. 
 98. See Cerone, supra note 8, at 359–60. 
 99. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
10(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222. 
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It is true that freedom of expression is an important and fundamental 
human right in both Denmark and the rest of Europe. According to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, “freedom of expres-
sion constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society 
and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual’s 
self-fulfillment.”100 
The European Court of Human Rights applied this reasoning to over-
turn the Supreme Court of Denmark (Højesteret) in Jersild v. Den-
mark.101 The conduct of the Danish authorities and the socio-political 
upheaval in the cartoon controversy may be understood as a conse-
quence, in the form of a backlash, of this highly controversial decision. 
In Jersild, the TV station DR (the only Danish public TV channel at that 
time) broadcast a program in 1985 in which young men, the so-called 
“Green Jackets,” expressed hateful and racist views about immigrants 
living in Denmark.102 A private party, the Bishop of Aalborg, filed a 
complaint against the young men, the program editor, and the journalist 
who conducted the interview. In 1987, they were all convicted under the 
hate speech provision in DCC section 266b.103 The journalist, Jens Olaf 
Jersild, appealed the judgment to the Danish Supreme Court, which, in 
1989, upheld the lower court’s judgment.104 In its judgment, the Supreme 
Court underscored that freedom of expression, as one of the most funda-
mental freedoms, deserved the strongest possible protection.105 However, 
the Court concluded that the journalist had abused this freedom by publi-
cizing the young men’s offensive statements, especially because other-
wise, it was unlikely that the young men would have had an audience.106 
                                                                                                             
 100. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 
¶ 49 (1976); Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1994); Steel and Morris 
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The European Court of Human Rights rejected the Danish Supreme 
Court’s view and found that Denmark’s imposition of criminal sanctions 
violated article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.107 The 
European Court concluded that the journalist had simply done his job: 
the program was informative, the context was not at all racist, and the 
intent was to illustrate that some marginal groups had very racist views 
on immigrants.108 For the European Court judges, the balance tipped in 
favor of freedom of expression. This shocked the Danish legal world. 
Judges and legal scholars thought that the Danish Supreme Court, sensi-
tive to the Danish domestic context, was correct: the statements were 
outrageous, and the young men and those who had promoted the state-
ments deserved punishment.109 The outcome in the European Court never 
gained acceptance in Denmark and as a result was misunderstood. As a 
consequence, an egregious misinterpretation spread among the Danish 
audience, namely that journalists could report anything in any way they 
chose because there was no limit to their freedom of expression. 
There are many differences between the Jersild case and the cartoon 
controversy, one being that the latter never became an actual case. In 
addition, there are two other important differences. First, publishing the 
cartoons seems to have been designed as a provocation and not as a pub-
lic information piece. If the newspaper had wanted to inform its reader-
ship about self-censorship based on the fear of reprisals by Muslims, the 
journalists could merely have documented the alleged threats. Second, in 
1985, the racist comments made by the young men outraged Danish citi-
zens on a large scale.110 Cartoons offending the religious feelings of part 
of the population more than twenty years later did not inspire the same 
outrage. 
In this new context, there were several ways the Prime Minister, the 
government, and the newspaper could have reacted, yet they chose to 
emphasize free expression to the exclusion of all other values as follows: 
1) freedom of expression is absolute; 2) absolute freedom of expression 
is a pillar of Danish society and culture, and therefore self-censorship is 
unacceptable; 3) because freedom of expression is absolute, the Prime 
Minister and government cannot criticize newspapers and journalists for 
exercising it. Yet, as demonstrated above, freedom of expression in 
Denmark is not absolute. Moreover, journalists often engage in self-
censorship, consciously or not; for a variety of reasons, journalists do not 
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write or disseminate all of the information at their disposal.111 Finally, 
the Prime Minister and members of the government can, of course, criti-
cize the media and journalists. Such criticism is part of the democratic 
process—it does not amount to interference with freedom of expression. 
Indeed, this absolutism is troubling in light of its questionable legal 
foundation and in light of other features of the broader Danish context, 
which, when taken together, may indicate an environment that was in-
hospitable, if not implicitly hostile, to Muslims. 
In the years preceding the cartoon controversy, the depiction of Mus-
lims in the Danish media and in public debates had been, if not directly 
negative, very often related to some kind of problem. In this respect, it is 
important to recall that the various incidents mentioned by the eleven 
ambassadors from Muslim countries in their letter to the Prime Minister 
were already well known.112 In addition, for some years the media had 
participated—more or less aggressively—in the ongoing over-exposure 
of problematic issues purportedly of concern to Muslims: wearing of 
scarves, circumcision, religious divorce, ritual slaughtering, forced mar-
riages, honor killings, and so-called “re-education trips” for youngsters 
to their parents’ countries of origins. These topics made for catchy head-
lines in the Danish media, often with very little documentation as to the 
reality, accuracy, and extent of the issues.113 Moreover, despite a growing 
Muslim population, at the time of the cartoon controversy there were no 
publicly funded places of worship or cemeteries for Muslims in Den-
mark.114 Finally, Denmark had for some time been subject to criticism 
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and scrutiny regarding its legal treatment of foreigners, citizenship, and 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin.115 The toughening up of 
the laws concerning foreigners or Danes with close ties to other countries 
of origin raised concern and criticism, both nationally and internation-
ally.116 Both the general climate in Denmark and the growing awareness 
of international and national observers shows that the publication of the 
cartoons did not occur in a vacuum. A context was already in place—one 
that might have elicited a more nuanced and sympathetic reaction from 
those in power. 
CONCLUSION 
The restrictive approach followed by the DPP in his decision excluded 
any reference to the broader context within which the Jyllands-Posten’s 
cartoons were published, and it did not question the motives of the news-
paper in publishing these cartoons. This is regrettable, but it does not 
necessarily mean that the decision of the DPP was legally incorrect. That 
said, the narrow construction of Danish law that the DPP applied also 
reflected its broader context because the outcome weighed so heavily in 
favor of freedom of expression. 
Human rights, like freedom of expression, should not be reduced to ab-
solutes. International human rights law is also based on the central value 
of respect for other human beings and on a common goal to ensure 
peace.117 In this respect, the cartoon controversy seems to be less about 
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the law and more about questions of decency, respect for others, and re-
sponsible behavior. At the time of publication, it seems that the political 
climate in Denmark made the cartoons’ publication completely uncon-
troversial to the Danish authorities—to them, that freedom of expression 
of the majority outranked the freedom of religion of the minority was 
self-evident. 
The ensuing international reaction shocked Denmark at large, but also 
resulted in important changes. The crisis gave greater visibility than ever 
before to Danish and non-Danish Muslims in Denmark.118 Within Den-
mark, the debate on Muslims, the role of the press, democratic values, 
and the place given to religion in the public sphere forged new connec-
tions between these groups in Danish society. Public authorities under-
took concrete initiatives concerning separate burial grounds for Muslims, 
and in September 2006, Denmark’s first Islamic cemetery opened in a 
suburb of Copenhagen.119 The media took steps to ensure more balanced 
coverage of the Muslim community in Denmark.120  
The Danish authorities’ insensitivity to the sentiments of the minority 
and the hostile socio-political context in which the cartoons occurred 
exacerbated the controversy and precipitated a diplomatic crisis. Al-
though the decision not to prosecute the Danish newspaper was a rela-
tively uncontroversial application of Danish law, had the Danish authori-
ties exercised greater sensitivity, much of the crisis could have been 
averted. 
As is often the case concerning the relation between the state and relig-
ion,121 an open dialogue could well have defused the conflict. To para-
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phrase the Director of English PEN, Jonathan Heawood,122 we must not 
allow a choice between our commitment to freedom of expression and 
our respect for religious and minority rights to be forced upon us. We 
must all learn to conduct an argument, a debate, and most importantly, a 
dialogue between all interested parties.123 
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